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Abstract
In 2009, US financier Bernard (Bernie) L. Madoff was jailed for 150 years after pleading guilty to 
running a massive ponzi scheme. While superficial condemnation was widespread, his US$65 billion 
fraud cannot be understood apart from the institutions, practices and fictions of contemporary 
finance capitalism. Madoff’s scam was rooted in the wider political prioritization of accumulation 
through debt expansion and the deregulated, desupervised and criminogenic environment 
facilitating it. More generally, global finance capital reproduces many of the core elements of 
the Madoff scam (i.e. mass deception, secrecy and obfuscation), particularly in neoliberalized 
Anglophone societies. We call this ‘Madoffization’. We suggest that societies are ‘Madoffized’, 
not only in the sense of their being subject to the ill-effects of speculative ponzi finance, but also 
in the sense that their prioritization of accumulation through debt expansion makes fraudulent 
practices, economic collapse and scapegoating inevitable.
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Introduction
In 2009, Bernard (Bernie) L. Madoff, a US financier, was jailed for 150 years after pleading guilty 
to running a ponzi scheme where he defrauded billions of dollars from his clients. Madoff’s noto-
riety spread with television documentaries, books and innumerable commentaries describing his 
‘extraordinary’ theft and its consequences for his investors. However, was Madoff’s scheme excep-
tional or does it tell us something about a more pervasive and corrosive institutionalized process?
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Against the backdrop of widespread superficial condemnation, we contend that Madoff repre-
sents something much more significant than a ‘rotten worm’ in an otherwise ‘healthy green apple’ 
(Žižek, 2009: 36). While Madoff committed outrageous crimes, his US$65 billion ponzi scheme 
depended on deregulation, desupervision and established institutional mechanisms of mass decep-
tion. Madoff’s fraud was rooted in a criminogenic environment that was simultaneously facilitat-
ing a wave of ‘control fraud’ (Black, 2005) right across the financial, insurance and real estate 
(FIRE) sector. When set against this, the Madoff case appears to be the tip of an iceberg. We sug-
gest that the dominance of fictitious finance capital, which prioritizes debt expansion as a means of 
accumulation, necessitates mass deception, secrecy, obfuscation and, eventually, scapegoating. We 
refer to this as ‘Madoffization’. The reference here is not to Madoff’s scam as such, but to the 
neoliberalized institutions that facilitated his ‘insane’ extractive practices and those of global 
finance capital more generally.
After outlining the idea of the ponzi scheme and Madoff’s scam, we will flag the political eco-
nomic conditions under which Madoffization has developed and morphed into its current form. As 
part of our discussion we compare the basic mechanics of Charles Ponzi’s original scam to that 
developed by Bernie Madoff, considering the scale of the latter in terms of its institutional(ized) 
supports. We identify conditions and features of finance capital, especially in neoliberalized 
Anglophone nations, that Madoff found ready-made and upon which the full development of his 
scheme and the broader Madoffization of 21st-century society depended. This, we would stress, 
provides an important qualifier to our discussion. Rather than obsessing about ‘deviant individuals’ 
and surface events, we are interested in critiquing the systemic contradictions and consequences of 
financial capitalism – a system in decline and which is devouring itself (Ticktin, 2009). 
Correspondingly, Madoff and his ilk should be viewed as substitutable actors who capitalize(d) 
upon a deeply flawed system that temporarily ‘fixed’ past crises but which is increasingly fragile 
and unsustainable.
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC: A Simple Ponzi 
Scheme?
A ponzi scheme is a fraudulent financial arrangement where funds from unsuspecting new inves-
tors are used to pay older investors. Charles Ponzi, in early 20th-century USA, became the name-
sake for this scam after he extracted several million dollars from investors (Zuckoff, 2005). As 
described in Mitchell Zuckoff’s (2005) account, investors were led to believe that their money was 
being invested in International Postal Union reply coupons, purchased in one country and redeemed 
elsewhere. According to Ponzi’s cover story, profits were made legitimately by exploiting differ-
ences in currency quotations. Ponzi’s story, along with the promise of a 50 percent return on money 
left with him for 90 days, attracted investors. The problem was that no such investments were actu-
ally made. Ponzi, a former convict, reportedly hoped to go ‘legitimate’ but discovered that there 
would have been immense practical problems when trying to implement his coupon redemption 
plan. Instead, as part of a ‘get rich quick’ scheme that snowballed out of control, Ponzi used the 
inflows from new investors to pay returns to earlier investors – a classic case of robbing Peter to 
pay Paul.
Ponzi’s scheme required a constant stream of new investors, which meant that existing and 
potential clients had to believe that real trades were being made. Fabricated evidence of trades and 
returns, executed by a fictitious European contact, enabled Ponzi temporarily to deflect suspicion, 
develop trust among clients and his employees and sustain an illusion of minimum risk. When 
coupled with a rate of return that would make almost any risk seem worth taking, Ponzi and his 
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commission-incentivized team convinced increasing numbers of people to part with their money. 
When the initial investors’ high expectations were subsequently realized, trust in the scheme 
appeared justified, which made it easier for more cautious investors to believe that the operation 
was legitimate, that trades were actually being made, that funds were growing overall and that 
there was little danger that the principal sum invested would be lost. Indeed, Ponzi’s firm reassured 
clients that they could receive a full refund prior to the maturity of their certificates, albeit without 
interest. Enthralled with Ponzi’s scheme, many clients ‘rolled over’ their initial capital plus interest 
in the expectation of greater future gains. Some investors even worked for Ponzi, selling a ‘prod-
uct’ they personally benefitted from and sincerely believed in.
An interesting feature of Ponzi’s arrangement was that his victims played a central role in per-
petuating and expanding the deception, however unwittingly. Such deception was necessary 
because the scheme could only continue so long as it grew in scale. Ever greater inflows were 
required and these were possible only because the recipients boasted that they had more than 
doubled their money within six months (even if they never actually collected these gains, in antici-
pation of an even larger future pay-out). Ponzi was, in turn, able to accumulate several million 
dollars in the bank, with his bank statements serving as a prop for publicly sustaining confidence 
and attracting even more investors. Such expansion, of course, also depended upon his marks’ 
culturally forged aspirations wherein the opportunity to ‘make money in one’s sleep’ was difficult 
to resist: the realization of the American dream! However, dreams and reality digress. With early 
entrants in Ponzi’s scheme devouring the capital of subsequent entrants, delivery of high stable 
returns to investors meant the scheme would have to expand exponentially. Schemes conforming 
to Ponzi’s model are fragile since the claims on wealth continue to expand, but the wealth does not. 
Claims inevitably out-strip the capacity to deliver on them, though, in Ponzi’s scam, this acceler-
ated following a suspension of deposits during a regulatory enquiry alongside concerns raised by 
an increasingly critical media.
The Madoff case, which came to light almost a century later, is in many respects comparable to 
Ponzi’s scam. As with Ponzi’s exploitation of the American Dream, Madoff obtained an inflow of 
funds by carefully fostering the belief that steady returns were certain. Again, this was based on 
fictitious claims. Before elaborating upon this, however, three immediate differences are worth 
noting. First, Madoff was much better placed than Ponzi to exploit people’s trust. Madoff estab-
lished his ‘sterling’ reputation over several decades on Wall Street as a successful financier and 
former chairman of the NASDAQ stock exchange (which he helped found in 1971 and chaired in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s). Second, Madoff’s scam dwarfed Ponzi’s scheme in its size and 
reach. According to the office of the Unites States Attorney, ‘investments’ with Madoff were worth 
just under US$65 billion on paper (Lewis, 2010a). Lionel Lewis (2010a: 439) writes that up to the 
point of collapse in 2008, ‘individuals and institutions from over 40 countries, 339 funds, and 59 
management companies were invested with’ Madoff. Some of his biggest investors were banks, 
such as Santander with US$2.87 billion in exposure (Lewis, 2010a: 441). Third, Madoff’s down-
fall was the consequence of a broader systemic crisis rather than the sustained actions of regulators 
and journalists. It was during the 2008 banking crisis and near meltdown of the financial system 
(CBS News, 2011) that Madoff’s firm encountered ‘liquidity’ problems. It was at this time that 
many clients wanted to exit the market and sought redemptions equalling several billion dollars. 
However, Madoff’s clients would be in for a shock along with his family who, according to public 
accounts, were not privy to his secret.
On 10 December 2008 Madoff reportedly confessed to his family that his business had been 
insolvent for years (Voreacos and Glovin, 2008). Referencing an attorney’s statement – issued on 
behalf of Madoff’s sons, traders at Madoff Investment Securities – it is claimed that they ‘promptly’ 
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turned their father in to the authorities. Upon apprehension Madoff told the FBI that his business 
was ‘just one big lie’ and ‘basically, a giant Ponzi scheme’ (van de Bunt, 2010: 436). During sub-
sequent legal proceedings, including the prosecution of Madoff’s close senior colleague, Frank 
DiPascali Jr, ‘one simple fact’ to transpire was that ‘no purchases or sales of securities were actu-
ally taking place in [clients’] accounts. It was all a fake. It was all fictitious’ (cited by Lewis, 
2010b: 534). While the basic mechanics of Ponzi’s scheme were repeated in the Madoff case, we 
would argue that a fraud on such a scale, developed almost in plain sight, required deep roots in the 
wider financial, political and regulatory systems. The Madoff case demonstrated that no matter the 
volume of wealth ‘managed’, no matter the practices or risks involved (ranging from security and 
wire fraud to money laundering) (Lewis, 2010b), it was possible to get an all-clear from the SEC. 
It also demonstrated that the feeder funds involved could get the all-clear from the biggest and 
most respected accountancy firms and rating agencies. Somewhat ironically, Madoff’s ability to 
obtain ‘a clean bill of health’ from the US government’s Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
– an organization that claims to protect investors – also enabled him to reassure more investors and 
thus continue to extract funds over two decades (Lewis, 2010b: 539).
In a sense Madoff’s fraud fell through a net that was designed to catch nothing and which, espe-
cially in the ‘deregulated’ environment that proliferated from the 1980s onwards, would ‘lead to a 
greater weight of speculative-ponzi activity’ in the system (Rasmus, 2008: 23). In short, the growth 
of Madoff’s scheme was inextricably linked to the processes of deregulation and desupervision, 
which enabled ‘control fraud’ to flourish within the FIRE sector. Former regulator William K. 
Black (2005) explains that while certain regulations may still hold in legal terms, if they are not 
supervised then they may as well not exist. It is in this context that Black (2005: 1–5) defines con-
trol fraud as a company that may be used offensively or defensively ‘to defraud others’ through 
accounting tricks (notably, massively overvaluing assets) while making such fraud ‘difficult to 
detect and punish’.
Despite this criminogenic environment some of the most astute investors stuck with Madoff to 
the very end. Fraud investigator Harry Markopolos (2010) noted that investors were often in awe 
of Madoff’s apparent ability to beat the market. Indeed, Madoff’s clients believed they were mak-
ing substantial returns year on year without exception. Also, unlike most other firms, but in echo-
ing Ponzi’s scam, investors were given the option of withdrawing their money at any time, which 
aided the illusion of near-zero risk. According to Markopolos, investors usually ‘felt privileged that 
he [Madoff] had taken their money’ (2010: 39). The apparently favourable arrangements they 
entered into with Madoff produced a form of cognitive dissonance, which ended only with his 
arrest by the FBI for securities fraud. As Markopolos (2010: 38) puts it: ‘Madoff was the Wizard 
of Oz, making everybody so happy that they didn’t want to look behind the curtain’. Several clients 
and managers of feeder funds suspected that Madoff was front-running or profiting on the basis of 
some other fraud, but left their investments in place since they believed themselves to be the ben-
eficiaries rather than the victims. Doubts were also weighed against the expectation that they could 
quickly remove their money if necessary. That might have been possible if Madoff had been con-
ducting another form of fraud. However, when it comes to ponzi schemes, collapse is usually sud-
den, total and without warning (as happened in 2008). Although early investors had realized 
returns, overall wealth had not increased and by 2009 Madoff faced life behind bars while most of 
his clients would lose almost everything.
An interesting aspect of this case is that many ‘insiders’ assumed Madoff’s operation was fraud-
ulent and accepted it (Markopolos, 2010). This sneaking regard for fraud was nothing new. During 
the extensive investigations of the US Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis in the late 1980s, Black 
(2005) concluded that particular regulatory environments lead to the normalization and acceptance 
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of fraud among so-called ultra-high-net-worth-individuals, financial firms, government officials, 
regulatory agencies, rating agencies and accountancy firms. However, few could have predicted 
the effective decriminalization of financial fraud thereafter. Black (2011) contrasts the sentencing 
of over 1000 insiders during the S&L debacle with the much larger and largely unpunished wave 
of fraud exposed in the wake of the 2008 collapse. In fact, as per the bailout of Wall Street follow-
ing the US subprime mortgage crisis, crime paid for many of the big institutional players (those 
deemed ‘too big to fail’).
In short, the ‘regulatory environment’ that served to obscure the fraudulent mortgage-backed 
securities market also obscured Madoff’s practices, at least as far back as 1992 (Lewis, 2010b). 
Each operated under the cover of a systemically manufactured chimera of respectability. 
Markopolos (2010), who uncovered evidence of Madoff’s fraud as early as 2001, sought in vain to 
find a receptive audience. Up to 2008 whistle-blowers and fraud investigators were often ignored, 
partly because questioning irregularities in particular cases drew attention to the institutional 
mechanisms of mass deception and the sources of legitimacy that served the rest of the FIRE sector 
so well. To seriously question Madoff was to open a can of worms in a domain where client confi-
dence and trust is requisite. While Madoff was subsequently scapegoated when his ponzi scheme 
imploded, alongside SEC regulators who were presented as ‘bureaucratic dullards’ (Lewis, 2010b: 
538), we contend that to expose his fictions at the height of his colossal scam would be to risk 
exposing the entire Madoffized system. To appreciate this more fully we need to situate Madoff’s 
scheme in the post-1970s era of global neoliberalization and unfettered financialization.
Conditions for the Madoffization of Society: Global 
Neoliberalization and the Resurgence of Fictitious Finance 
Capital
As Karl Marx (1990 [1867]) explains in his critique of political economy, capitalism is imbued 
with systemic contradictions, such as the problem of declining opportunities for profitable invest-
ments. This is a recurrent problem, and, as with the 1929 stock market crash and Great Depression, 
its consequences have proven disastrous for millions of people. Thereafter, various ‘doubled edged 
fixes’ emerged. War, imperialism or US super-imperialism, the New Deal, Keynesian stimulus 
policies and so-called military Keynesianism (Cold War spending) were the consequence of and 
partial remedy for structural contradictions, helping to ‘sustain’ capitalism. However, as explained 
by David Harvey (2001: 24) when using the metaphor of the drug addict, the ‘fix’ is always tem-
porary. Moreover, as with interest-bearing fictitious capital, the ‘fix’ may serve as ‘the fountain-
head of all manner of insane forms’ (Marx, 1991 [1894], cited by Harvey, 2006 [1982]: 266–70).
In the post-1970s era, efforts to ‘resolve’ capitalism’s tendency towards over-accumulation (sur-
plus value that cannot be profitably absorbed) included a reinvigorated emphasis on the ‘spatial 
fix’, i.e. geographic expansion and restructuring of capitalist activity in the neoliberal phase of 
globalization (Harvey, 2001). Greater relative weight was also afforded to finance over industrial 
capital, particularly in the USA and UK. Again, these spatio-temporal fixes helped mitigate capital-
ism’s crisis-tendencies in the ‘core’ while sowing the seeds for future (bigger) problems on a global 
stage. Of course, following our reference to Marx (1991 [1894]), finance has played a recurrent 
role in the history of Western capitalism. For instance, it was dominant in 19th-century Germany 
(Hilferding, 1910), and the era preceding the 1929 crash was a period of speculative ‘high finance’ 
(De Vogli, 2011). However, the resurgence, transmutation and global expansion of finance capital 
in the post-1970s era are significant for our thesis. This process was intimately entwined with the 
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rise of neoliberalism, deregulation and desupervision (faith in market fundamentalism and self-
regulation outside of national or global governance). These structural changes provided the fertile 
conditions under which Madoffization – almost virus-like – emerged and developed.
The 1970s, under the ‘tutelage’ of the capitalist elite and neo-classical economists, marked the 
beginning of the end of the post-war consensus and capitalism’s so-called Golden Age. As the 
Bretton Wood System unravelled, the commitment to full employment was abandoned; the ‘reserve 
army of labour’ was partially revived and new opportunities for investment were created by means 
of deregulation, privatization and financialization. Finance capital, according to Harvey (2006 
[1982]: 293), is not entirely negative: a sophisticated ‘credit system’ lubricates the circulation of 
capital. Yet, finance can be pushed to an extreme, as happened with the neoliberal finance-led pro-
cess of globalization, so that its connection with labour becomes highly tenuous and its ‘parasitic’ 
tendencies prevail (Ticktin, 2010: 361). With the resurgence of finance capital post-1970, rent-
seeking behaviour acquired greater significance alongside global movements of excess ‘liquid capi-
tal’ that sought higher returns outside of domestic environments (Deutschmann, 2011: 354). For 
Hillel Ticktin (2010) the timing of this shift was no accident. Members of the ruling class were 
finally forced to revive and expand finance capital with the worldwide revolts that erupted in 1968, 
after which time the policy of full employment was abandoned and workers were disciplined through 
job insecurity. The tendency thereafter – in the parts of the world dominated by finance capital – has 
been towards deindustrialization. What was especially perverse was that workers’ savings, via 
‘pension-fund’ or ‘money manager capitalism’, were appropriated and used to attack labour and 
industrial capital (e.g. through corporate looting and asset stripping) (Hudson, 2010: 439).
Although the geographic spread of neoliberalization has been uneven, upper classes benefitted 
from this redistributive project (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalization basically helped curb the mili-
tancy of the working class in various developed nations while channelling surplus capital into 
‘profit-generating’ domains such as off-shore industry or, more lucratively, finance capital itself 
(Ticktin, 2009). In the decades after 1970, capital was increasingly devoted to interest-bearing debt 
creation, and the subordination of the real economy to those rent-seeking and short-termist specu-
lative endeavours that characterize financial or casino capitalism. Consequently, in most OECD 
countries (but especially those with weaker labour unions), rentiers enjoyed an increasing share of 
national income (Deutschmann, 2011). Harvey (2005: 90) similarly notes that ‘entrepreneurial 
financiers … consolidated large fortunes’ and, as with US CEOs, became the envy of other elites 
in countries less dominated by neoliberalism. Financialization thus bolstered the fiction that money 
creates wealth out of thin air – the fantasy of ‘making money from money itself in a sterile “zero 
sum” transfer of payment’ (Hudson, 2010: 424).
The notion that it is possible to create wealth apart from the process of production is an obfusca-
tion of reality. Only capital that is invested productively increases the mass of goods and services, 
resulting in relatively clear exchange values, as abstract labour (value) is embodied in the items 
produced (Marx, 1990 [1867]: 125–52). Since productive capital exploits abstract human labour, 
the surplus drawn from it can be reinvested again in the process of commodity production; this is 
why productive capital is said to be self-expanding. In contrast, finance capital is sterile and dis-
embodied. It merely transfers capital from where it is originally accumulated to itself (Blunden, 
2010; Ticktin, 2009). Hence, finance capital represents an overhead; it does not produce use value 
and it is not self-expanding capital. Any apparent expansion of wealth in the financial sector is 
really just an expansion of its claims on wealth (Soddy, 1926). Michael Hudson (2010: 421) reiter-
ates this point when critiquing the ‘imaginary’ financial claims made by the likes of Goldman 
Sachs, which, if left unchecked, pave the way for debt-peonage and the neo-feudal tollbooth 
economy.
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Understood as such, finance or ‘money capital’ it is not really capital, which is why Marx called 
it ‘fictitious’ (Marx, 1991 [1894]: 525–40). The returns to financial investors must be drawn from 
the surplus value extracted by productive capitalist firms. Productive or not, every unit of capital 
demands its pound of flesh. Any broad shift in the direction of fictitious capital means that the 
surplus value has to be distributed among an increased mass of unproductive capital, spreading it 
more thinly (Blunden, 2010). Restated, finance capital deals in ever-expanding claims on wealth, 
which can only be satisfied if wealth production occurs in the real economy. The picture is, of 
course, complex and we lack the space to discuss all possible relevancies. What we would empha-
size here, though, is that finance became a key mechanism of extraction (secondary exploitation, 
dispossession) in neoliberalized nations via usurious bank lending on a vast scale, as occurred dur-
ing the recent housing boom on both sides of the Atlantic. This speculative frenzy, in turn, paved 
the way for the sudden implosion of the global derivatives market and capitalism’s first great crisis 
in the 21st century.
The massive growth of fictitious (usury, parasitic) finance capital and, by extension the 
Madoffization of society, accelerated post-2000. Various ‘enablers’ and ‘stimulants’ were instru-
mental, such as the repeal of the US Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, established after the 1929 crash in 
order to ensure safer banking practices. Financialization was also spurred by rapid developments 
in the forces of production (computer technology, notably the internet that enabled instant global 
trading) (Hassan, 2011) and capitalism’s finance and securitization revolution in commodity 
money forms and intermediaries: for instance, Credit Default Swaps and Structured Investment 
Vehicles. Jack Rasmus (2008) flags these instruments when critically extending the theories of 
Hyman Minsky and Karl Marx to the deepening global crisis. That is, ‘an epic recession’ attribut-
able to antecedent fundamentals that have resulted in exponential debt expansion and subsequent 
insolvency at the sovereign level.
In line with Rasmus (2008: 7), we concur that finance capital has achieved dominance in a 
global context where ‘the drive for profitability amidst systemic counter-pressures reducing profit-
ability’ explains, in no small part, the acceleration of speculative and super-speculative (ponzi) 
finance in the 21st century. Rasmus describes the massive acceleration of financially destabilizing 
speculation during the past decade, as market participants pursued the fragile fantasy of super-
profitable quick returns ‘by borrowing or by selling [inflated] assets’ (2008: 21). Clearly, then, the 
fantasy that Ponzi and Madoff exploited – the dream of quickly making money without effort – has 
persisted (proliferated) under conditions of global neoliberalization. These are the conditions for 
the Madoffization of society more generally.
Core Elements of Madoffization
Core elements of Madoffization, which reflect and reproduce the underlying irrationality of finan-
cial capitalism, include: (1) accumulation through debt expansion, (2) mass deception, (3) efforts 
to maintain secrecy and silence, (4) obfuscation and (5) scapegoating. These elements, in varying 
combinations and with different emphases, have proven instrumental in the larger neoliberal class 
project of accumulation through dispossession (Harvey, 2005) though, as with ponzi investing, this 
process is ultimately unsustainable. We outline each of these elements below under separate sub-
headings as part of an ideal typical model. We would stress that in practice these elements, exem-
plified in the Madoff case but also observed in the larger society, are often intertwined. Finally, 
Madoffization is not an all or nothing process. In particular instances there may be different degrees 
of Madoffization, with various elements and combinations of elements coming to the fore.
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Accumulation through Debt Expansion
One of the fictions of finance capital is that debt equals wealth, with terms such as ‘credit’ obscur-
ing the reality of indebtedness. Madoff incurred massive debts as a consequence of his ponzi 
scheme and these debts were transferred to clients who had previously assumed they were solvent, 
if not wealthy. More generally, if global neoliberalization entails accumulation of wealth for elites 
by dispossession (Harvey, 2005), then, within the Madoffized society, massive debt expansion 
plays a key role in this process. Debts, such as mortgages for massively overvalued homes in 
‘advanced’ economies, have increased rapidly in recent years. Debt expansion proceeded as man-
agers of capital surpluses (banks, hedge funds, etc.), plus many homeowners, hoped to gain from 
speculative and ponzi finance (Rasmus, 2008). Yet, as with Ponzi and Madoff, what on paper 
appears to be wealth is actually interest-bearing debt that has to be paid regardless of the medium- 
to long-term ability of the debtor. In that respect, Madoffization and the present crisis are bound up 
with a form of accumulation that is not only unsustainable but also counterproductive.
Given the dominance of bank lending for real estate in this equation, we would flag the worlds’ 
largest financial firms’ dependence on the securitization of ‘liar loans’ (mortgages approved with-
out adequate documentation or any documentation on the debtors’ abilities to repay), and on the 
billions accumulated on this basis. The first decade of this century saw liar loans issued in unprec-
edented numbers, and thereafter packaged and sold on the global securities market. The subprime 
portion of the mortgage market – fuelled by the banks’ ‘teaser’ interest rates that led millions of 
poor people to buy into the dream of home ownership right up until the property bubble burst 
(Blackburn, 2008) – accelerated rapidly after 2003. According to Rasmus (2008) there were more 
than $635 billion in subprime loans in the US by 2005. Another $600 billion of subprime loans was 
added in 2006. The trading of securities, backed by subprime loans, boosted the ‘profits’ of firms 
like Goldman Sachs. Billions of dollars were accumulated in the salaries, bonuses and stock 
options. The nature of the debts backing trades was not disclosed. The form of accumulation that 
they facilitated invariably involved deception, made possible with support from one of the top tier 
auditing firms, regulators and one of the three main rating agencies, which provided AAA ratings 
for these financial products (Black, 2011). Hence, the pass Madoff exploited should be seen in its 
generalized form, stemming from a misrepresentation of rapidly expanding debt as wealth.
Since finance capital is unproductive, a ‘free-luncher’ in Hudson’s (2010) terms, any gains that 
are realized must involve a loss elsewhere. So-called ‘gains’ represent no more than overheads on 
productive capital. Consider, for example, how private equity firms leave profitable industries 
loaded with debt, or bankrupt. In 2004, US private equity firm Blackstone bought Southern Cross: 
the UK’s largest care-home business, caring for 31,000 elderly people. The company, which was 
bought for £162m, was sold on three years later, leaving the company with a £250m rent bill; 
Blackstone is believed to have quadrupled its original investment. The returns on such an invest-
ment cannot be considered ‘wealth creation’ by any stretch – no extra buildings were constructed, 
no extra beds became available and no extra meals were served. The company’s homes were sim-
ply sold off, forcing Southern Cross to lease the properties from the new owner (Shipman, 2011).
As this example illustrates, gains are only achievable as part of a zero-sum game (also see 
Ticktin, 2010). Such speculative/parasitic activity rests either on unequal trades within the FIRE 
sector itself (trades that necessitate deception) or they rest on a diminution of wealth outside of the 
FIRE sector. The latter includes asset stripping, involving temporary (debt-leveraged) asset-price 
inflations, with accumulation realized through loading other parties with debt. More broadly, entire 
societies have become massively indebted because of suicidal government ‘bank bailouts’ follow-
ing the most recent frenzy of speculative (ponzi) activity, the inevitable unwinding of asset prices 
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and subsequent insolvency of ‘big’ players in the FIRE sector. In that respect, accumulation through 
debt expansion has run amok in the Madoffized society. Disturbingly, it is in this context that the 
World Economic Forum hungers for continued debt expansion, claiming that an extra US$100 tril-
lion in ‘credit’ is needed to support global ‘economic growth’ [sic] (Rowley, 2011). In the 
Madoffized society the ‘answer’ to a debt crisis is to load people with even more debt, the enormity 
of which is difficult to comprehend.
Mass Deception: From Control Fraud to Collective Delusion
Accumulation through debt expansion is advanced through dishonest business practices. Indeed, 
the FIRE sector is a well-documented domain of mass deception and fraud where ‘business as 
usual’ too often comprises ‘outright illegality’ (Hassan 2011: 395). Of course, swindling in its vari-
ous guises is not new; ‘stock watering’, for example, where speculators borrow money in order to 
make a killing at other people’s expense, was common in early 20th-century finance (Harvey, 2006 
[1982]: 277). Yet, when discussing the proliferation of deception in today’s context we would 
accord significance to the broader neoliberalized environment that has provided fertile conditions 
for institutionalized fraud. As noted above with reference to the S&L scandal, Black (2005) uncov-
ered massive institutional fraud committed by bankers and politicians. Such ‘control fraud’ is 
another core element in the Madoffization process.
While Black (2005) immediately points out that control fraud destroys trust, such deception also 
reflects and helps to reproduce exploitative class relations. The end of debt expansion involves, in 
the final analysis, securing claims on wealth by transferring debts to unsuspecting victims (though 
victimhood may be deferred to the future, and, as with the current sovereign debt crisis in countries 
such as Ireland, victimhood includes entire nations). The main beneficiaries of this parasitism are 
high-net-worth investors and the top executives of financial firms, a transnational cabal or ‘feral 
overclass’ (see Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012). Such transfers invariably involve bending or break-
ing established regulations; insiders amass fortunes through deception, which is to the long-term 
detriment of other people who are less favourably placed in the divided and divisive Madoffized 
society.
There is a documented method to this madness. While specifics will vary according to context, 
the pattern outlined by Black (2005) in the S&L debacle involves the deliberate issue of bad loans. 
In the short term, high profits are reported which, in turn, allows massive bonuses to be claimed. 
Black (2011) later pointed out that for 80 percent of the ‘liar loans’ the deception was on the part 
of the lending institutions, not borrowers. While some of Madoff’s deceptions were blatant (e.g. 
wire fraud), control fraud rarely involves direct theft such as through transfers to personal accounts. 
Control frauds depend instead on deceptive accounting (to record high profits and to hide losses), 
regulators and rating agencies. Black (2005: 2) points out that all of the frauds involved in the S&L 
debacle managed to get the all clear from at least one of the so-called ‘Big 8’ audit firms. The 
fraudsters were able to shop around for accommodating accountants, appraisers and attorneys. 
Black (2011) maintains that this environment makes waves of control fraud inevitable. No lessons 
in how to reduce such fraud were learned as a consequence of the 1980s S&L debacle; the crimi-
nogenic environment was maintained and proliferated right up to the cataclysmic crash of 2008.
The proliferation and normalization of fraud reflect the power and influence of the FIRE sector, 
wherein institutionalized dishonesty often pays. Understandably, then, Slavoj Žižek has cautioned 
against all attempts to pathologize Madoff as an aberrant individual. Žižek (2009: 36) claims that 
‘the temptation to “morph” legitimate business into a pyramid scheme is part of the very nature of 
the capitalist circulation process’, and that ‘the very dynamic of capitalism blurs the frontier 
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between “legitimate” investment and “wild” speculation’. The desupervision of finance ensures 
that claims on wealth expand quite quickly, until a point is reached where financial firms can only 
keep a boom going ‘by lending their customers the money to pay interest and thus avoid default’ 
(Žižek, 2009: 35–6). In the lead up to a crisis, investment houses take clients’ money and issue 
promises of returns, even though the value of the investments must collapse. We are reminded here 
of parallel processes at the sovereign level; notably, Greece’s so-called ‘bailouts’ in 2011 and 2012.
In the USA, the engine room of global ponzi finance, investigative journalists have been busy 
exposing FIRE sector fraud. Matt Taibbi (2010, 2011) presents a colourful complement to finan-
cialization literature where ‘fraud and deception’ are noted strategies for boosting profits 
(Deutschmann, 2011: 358). Taibbi recently extended his 2010 argument that Goldman Sachs, the 
most powerful investment bank, is a ‘vampire squid’. Goldman Sachs’s predation includes ‘securi-
ties fraud’ or betting against mortgage-based products it sold to its own clients, with the bank 
subsequently paying several million dollars in compensation – small change relative to the billions 
extracted during the height of the US housing bubble. Taibbi (2011), citing a recent Senate com-
mittee report, also alleges that executives of Goldman Sachs not only stole from customers but also 
lied about this to Congress. We would add that practices defined as fraudulent, at least from the 
perspective of an investment firm’s clientele, may also be legal as international companies exploit 
‘loopholes’ in different countries. Consider, for example, the recent scandal surrounding MF 
Global’s bankruptcy and so-called re-hypothecation. This ‘chain of debt obligations’ basically 
entailed MF Global using clients’ funds for, subsequently unsuccessful, bets with the resultant 
‘loss’ (theft) of over US$1 billion (Elias, 2011).
Whether such redistributive practices are consciously executed, Machiavellian-like, by parasitic 
key actors and institutional players is secondary to our observation that some form of shared decep-
tion must emerge among myriad actors within an exploitative system of structured social relations. 
These actors, while varying in their degree of intent and culpability, have an individual and/or col-
lective stake in the game – or ‘gaming the system’ – until it becomes untenable. In short, mass 
deception is an interactive and structurally enabled process within a broader financialized system 
that might be interpreted by some as ‘resilient and self-stabilizing’ but which in actuality is highly 
volatile and devoid of ‘effective forms of economic or democratic control’ (Hassan, 2011: 388). 
This element of Madoffization may be broken down further. In addition to the obvious exploitation 
of trust, upon which control fraud depends, we would draw attention to collective and 
self-deception.
First, let us consider self-deception. Importantly, we are not simply dealing with a dichotomized 
one-way process here consisting of the deceiver and the deceived. Returning to the namesake of 
the pyramid scam, we are reminded of how Charles Ponzi deceived himself with the belief that it 
was possible to ‘buy’ sufficient time in order to ‘go legitimate’ and avoid another, much dreaded, 
spell in jail (Zuckoff, 2005). Similarly, Bernie Madoff reportedly confessed ‘I have been lying to 
myself’ as well as everybody else (CBS News, 2011). The heights of self-deception, it could be 
argued, are reached when elite bankers claim they are ‘doing God’s work’ (Phillips, 2009). Parallels 
exist here between 21st-century financiers and Weber’s early protestant capitalists who were 
searching for signs of salvation, with money serving as an indicator of God’s grace (Weber, 1930 
[1905]). Unlike the frugal early industrial capitalist, however, who reinvested earned profits into 
production, finance capital is extractive and invites conspicuous consumption even when the world 
is going to hell. Note, for example, the ‘chief of Merrill Lynch who bought an $87,000 area rug for 
his office as his company was imploding’ (Taibbi, 2010).
There is an obvious collective dimension to the above deceptions insofar as the self is a social 
construction. However, deception becomes a thoroughly collective affair when various parties 
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(who are by no means innocent) swindle each other. At the institutional level, big players have 
evidently fallen prey to others’ deceit. This was hinted at above when Santander ‘invested’ with 
Madoff and lost several billion dollars. Another example emerged when Lehman Brothers and 
Barclays sold JP Morgan ‘assets’, described as ‘goat poo’ by Lehman staff in internal email (Humer, 
2011). We would argue that money capitalists – insofar as they believe they are simply ‘pushing 
the envelope’ or ‘just boys doing business’ (Newburn and Stanko, 1994) – actively deceive them-
selves and others in their ‘innovative’ pursuit of the American dream. Here financiers along with 
various lackeys, cheerleaders and other ponzi merchants have a collective material interest in 
believing in and selling dreams, though, as with control fraud, we do not rule out intentional crimi-
nality. Credible and credited analyses of the 2008 financial crisis in the UK, for instance, attribute 
what has been called ‘the largest heist in history’ to intentional (and negligent) criminal activity. 
This argument is advanced in Greg Pytel’s (2009) report on the predictable problems that arise if 
banks loan more than they hold on deposit. Even so, we would suggest that the biggest ‘victims’ of 
Madoffization may, given their understandable hopes and aspirations in Western (debt-based) con-
sumer culture, unwittingly participate in their own exploitation amidst asymmetrical knowledge/
power. Indeed, while we would avoid a deficit model of social actors as cultural dopes, it is fair to 
assert that public consent to such processes has been actively manufactured over the past four 
decades as neoliberalism swept the globe (Harvey, 2005). The precise nature and costs of such 
exploitation, of course, vary depending upon people’s social structural location, culturally forged 
aspirations and willingness to participate in and reproduce a scheme built on shared illusions/delu-
sions. The debt-leveraged housing bubble provides a worthy case study in that respect.
Secrecy and Silence
Accumulation of debt through deceptive or fraudulent practices necessitates walls of secrecy and 
silence. In the Madoff case, intermediaries acted like a curtain that veiled the putatively ‘magical’ 
workings of the financial wizard while unfavourably redistributing risk to others. As explained by 
Markopolos (2010), Madoff’s deception was difficult for clients to detect since direct contact was 
rare. Madoff preferred to deal primarily with feeder funds. Some clients were unaware that Madoff 
had their money. The investors that did have access to Madoff were threatened with having their 
money promptly returned to them if they ever talked of their dealings (Markopolos, 2010: 38).
Other researchers have commented on the micro-sociological dynamics at play here. Drawing 
from criminological literature on white collar crime and ‘the trusted criminal’, alongside Georg 
Simmel’s classic writing on secret societies, Henk van de Bunt (2010) offers some interesting 
insights. Namely, Madoff’s fraudulent activities were sustained over time not simply due to his 
ability to hide his scam (his strategy was imperfect and ‘red flags’ were raised, as previously noted) 
but also because many victims and experts, as well as regulators, had reasons to keep quiet.
Similarly, silence may be bought as part of the shady workings of the broader Madoffized soci-
ety: van de Bunt (2010) cites the Enron scandal, which implicated parties ranging from corporate 
executives and accountants to other employees and investors. Elsewhere in the US, Taibbi (2010) 
draws attention to ‘semi-secret government exemption’ granted to Goldman Sachs to trade in com-
modities, notably oil, using financial derivatives that were hitherto only permitted for foodstuffs 
and which were originally intended to protect farmers’ livelihoods. And, after the 2008 banking 
collapse, Taibbi mentions the secrecy surrounding the multi-trillion dollar bailout, with the pri-
vately owned Federal Reserve using an obscure law to block most congressional audits. No doubt, 
other issues could also be explored here, such as the secretive ‘shadow banking system’ with its 
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‘off-balance sheet’ (unregulated) transactions (including re-hypothecation, described above in rela-
tion to MF Global’s bankruptcy).
During the Madoffization process, when society is euphorically gripped by apparent wealth 
creation (read: debt expansion) there is an implicit, if not explicit, belief that some things are best 
left in the shadows or untouched (or barely touched, as in ‘light-touch’ financial regulation). This 
element of Madoffization, then, implicates groups who should anticipate problems but who have a 
vested interest in not enquiring and enforcing rules or, if they are suspicious or openly aware of 
immoral/illegal practices, not speaking out for various reasons (e.g. the fear of reputational dam-
age). Similarly, Hassan (2011: 386), when discussing the current crisis in capitalism, writes that 
‘policymakers, economists and traders and bankers whose thoughts, actions and rationalizations 
were determinedly elsewhere’ ignored the warnings from certain economists, such as Steve Keen, 
who drew attention to the ‘darkening skies’ (also see Bezemer, 2009). This problem was also 
clearly observed in ‘Celtic Tiger’ Ireland when certain commentators warned of the property bub-
ble in advance of the collapse. Taoiseach Bertie Ahern infamously responded to any such sugges-
tion in 2007 as such: ‘sitting on the sidelines cribbing and moaning is a lost opportunity. I don’t 
know how people who engage in that don’t commit suicide’ (cited by McCullagh, 2010: 38). In 
making such remarks, political elites sought to gag critics through fear of ridicule. This added fur-
ther fuel to an out of control market that subsequently burnt to the ground.
Similar to other interacting and reinforcing elements of Madoffization, then, we would be quite 
clear that efforts to maintain secrecy and silence go beyond the individual: this element runs 
through a broader configuration of social practices and institutions that have woven a web of fic-
tions. Moreover, not only have these fictions exacerbated the socio-economic and political prob-
lems currently witnessed in the USA, Europe and beyond; they are continuing to have corrosive 
effects. Note how, according to mainstream media discourse and political spin, the ‘mysterious’ 
workings of ‘impersonal markets’ determine the fates of populations much akin to vengeful gods 
who we can never know. Hassan also draws attention to the secretive and consequential nature of 
financial capital, when he writes: ‘the economic fates of millions are tied to super-secretive finan-
cial entities, and to democratically unaccountable individuals who continue to see the world and its 
opportunities through the same perspective they did at the height of the boom’ (Hassan, 2011: 398 
[emphasis added]). Hassan adds to this when discussing the role of ICT and computer generated 
algorithmic trading, comprising programmes that are ‘developed and deployed in secret’ (Hassan, 
2011: 399). At the same time, this also entails ‘many politicians, in the context of not really know-
ing what they are doing, and not ideologically predisposed toward fundamental alternatives to 
neoliberal dynamics’ appearing ostrich-like when they ‘shut their eyes’ and ‘cover their ears’ 
(Hassan, 2011: 400). We share Hassan’s pessimism when he writes: ‘[t]he crisis next time will 
arrive sooner and be more devastating than the last’. The crisis tendency of financial capitalism is 
compounded by other corrosive elements within the Madoffized society.
Obfuscation: Ideological Misrepresentations and Misrecognition
Agents and benefactors of Madoffization do not simply rely on secrecy and silence. They also have 
a tendency to publicly obfuscate the reality and (unintended) consequences of their corrosive prac-
tices to keep them hidden from other people and themselves, as suggested by our discussion on 
mass deception and self-deception. The success of obfuscation depends upon hegemony and the 
power of ideology, which is a vehicle for misrepresentations and misrecognition. As Peter Berger 
(1963) explains, ideology enables people to act with sincerity when espousing what others con-
sider lies.
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In that respect, then, obfuscation, or obscuring the reality of class exploitation and ‘the fictions 
of fictitious capital’ (Hudson, 2010), adds another layer of complexity to our discussion. When 
exploring Madoffization we want to be clear that we are not simply or necessarily dealing with 
outright deception and conspiracies by trusted criminals, relevant as these may or may not be in 
specific cases that are brought before the legal system. Secret societies, co-conspirators and white 
collar criminals who have a shared interest in keeping quiet through fear of exposure and punish-
ment should not be ignored and trivialized, though what we describe as Madoffization includes the 
possibility of a far more mundane yet threatening process. Indeed, and following Naomi Klein’s 
(2007: 426) argument about disaster capitalism, where she asserts ‘no conspiracies are necessary’, 
it could be posited that Madoffization is altogether ‘less sinister and more dangerous’. If obfusca-
tion is to cloud an issue, in the context of Madoffization the cloud is extremely dark and expansive, 
and it limits the possibility of clear vision in the higher reaches of society. Madoffization effec-
tively blinds people – such as politicians and economists who could make a difference – to how 
‘the financial leech is killing its economic host’ (Hassan, 2011: 399). Two forms of obfuscation, 
relating to different stages of Madoffization, immediately stand out.
First, when Madoffization seemingly yields fantastic gains, money capitalists misrepresent var-
ious ‘financial instruments’ or ‘commodity money forms’ (Derivatives, Structured Investment 
Vehicles, Credit Default Swaps, etc.). These forms constitute ‘a complex web of assorted products 
that allowed for profits to be made’ (Hassan, 2011: 387), ostensibly at zero risk to individual 
‘investors’ through hedging (insuring) with a counterparty. Yet, as subsequently transpired, these 
products proved immensely destructive, representing the modern day incarnation of those ‘insane 
forms’ that Marx (1991 [1894]) condemned when critiquing fictitious capital. More contemporane-
ously, even the mega-rich raised concerns about ‘mad’ financial instruments several years before 
the current crisis: in 2003 Warren Buffett, albeit for personal reasons, referred to these instruments 
as ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’ (BBC News, 2003). In that respect, ‘mad’ might read 
M.A.D. (mutually assured destruction), though such wordplay obscures the fact that the toxic fall-
out from financial weapons is not evenly distributed in class-divided societies; indeed, it emerged 
that Buffett was concerned about derivatives before they imploded because he owned ‘US$63 bil-
lion himself and [was] pushing for the amendment of the US Senate bill requiring that they be 
insured against loss’ (Ticktin, 2010: 371). Extending the military metaphor in order to critique 
rather than profit from ‘banker style world capitalism’, Hudson lambasts these instruments as 
weapons of financial warfare that are more effective than tanks and bombs (Guns and Butter, 
2011). The attempted obfuscation of these explosive mechanisms of profiteering – at least when 
ponzi finance appears to generate wealth – constructs a chimera of respectability and means–end 
technical competence deserving of massive remuneration, as exemplified by the bankers’ bonus 
culture. Such ‘rewards’ (spoils of class warfare and Madoffized finance, we might say) allegedly 
serve to incentivize ‘the very best’ who generate quick profits. This has continued even after finan-
cial institutions were exposed as castles, or rather casinos, in the sky.
Second, and connected to the misrepresentation of esoteric financial instruments and mecha-
nisms of wealth transference, is the on-going misrecognition of power relations and the putative 
‘remedial interventions’ demanded by such relations. This aspect of Madoffization unfolds as pow-
erful groups endeavour to proceed with their incredulous fantasy of unlimited accumulation (at 
public expense), or justify this in line with dominant ideological interests. For example, Hassan 
(2011: 395 [emphasis added]) notes how, when the financial crisis exploded, the government ‘res-
cue plan’ entailed ‘the obfuscation and anesthetization of the general population by labelling the 
propping up of the fatally flawed economic system as a “stimulus package”’. As per Pierre 
Bourdieu’s (1999) concept of misrecognition in his studies of class domination and the social 
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causes and patterning of human misery, such obfuscation has injurious effects that are trivialized, 
re-framed or ignored by those who benefit from existing class arrangements (e.g. politicians who 
routinely refer to savage austerity cuts as ‘savings’). Misrecognition emerges in the Madoffized 
society as architects and chief benefactors of this extractive process attempt to sustain their hege-
mony, broader influence and ‘ill-gotten’ gains through the socialization of private losses.
Despite resistances among an increasingly savvy and politicized public, we are mindful of how 
the political and economic elites use channels of mass communication (misinformation, propa-
ganda) to reiterate stupefying claims that ‘we are where we are’, there is a ‘need for solidarity’ and 
‘we must all share in the pain’ (McCullagh, 2010). This element of obfuscation, then, is especially 
salient for the power elite when vast numbers of people, unwitting victims of Madoffization, face 
an altered (that is, impoverished and dire) economic reality. Obfuscation could be described as 
ideology in practice or what Hudson (2010: 438) terms ‘covert ideological manipulation’ in the 
midst of an ‘economic counter-Enlightenment’ that has largely silenced critics. This manipulation 
is facilitated via ‘junk economics and junk accounting, which are the logical complements to ficti-
tious capital’ (Hudson, 2010: 425).
Such obfuscation, which is ongoing in various nations, has been documented by criminologists 
and left-leaning economists. Black (2005: 10) explains how US regulators sought to cover-up S&L 
control fraud once it had surfaced by endorsing ‘absurd accounting abuses like “loan loss deferral” 
(which meant not recognizing losses currently)’. This, in turn, provided conditions for a subse-
quent wave of control fraud. More recently, ideology in practice is laid bare in post ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
Ireland, as per Michael Taft’s (2011) critique of the supposedly independent Fiscal Advisory 
Council’s (FAC) first report on the ‘positive’ impact of government austerity on the nation’s defi-
cit. After identifying mistakes in the initial and subsequently withdrawn report, Taft explains that 
the FAC compounded their mistakes with ‘spin designed to mislead readers’. Obfuscation is a 
close cousin of scapegoating, the final element of Madoffization that we will consider.
Scapegoating: Pointing the Finger of Blame at Myriad Targets
As with attributions of deviance and blame, scapegoating is a labelling process. It is especially 
salient when ponzi schemes collapse (or when they should have collapsed but are propped up 
though massive injections of liquidity as per government bailouts of the FIRE sector). During the 
end-stage of Madoffization, scapegoating comes into play through an individual and collective 
desire for identifying, blaming and punishing alleged culprits. We might argue that Bernie Madoff, 
regardless of his criminal intentions, was treated as a scapegoat within an expansive system that 
spawned him, enabled him and others to profit and which is comparable in form if not content. As 
with the specific Madoff case, this element may discredit key players, though it is much more 
likely to hurt the greater number of people at the bottom of the social structure (pyramid scheme) 
as the system falls apart or is put on life-support.
Scapegoating implicates multiple agents or actors. The everyday targets of scapegoating range 
from the person who acquired a large mortgage at the height of the property boom, and who can no 
longer afford repayments, to the entire population of odiously indebted nations. The latter has been 
recurrent during the 2011 Eurozone crisis where the risk of a Greek default was accompanied by 
racist stereotypes in the international media. Scapegoating, in that respect, could be defined as a 
form of ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu, 1999) enacted within and reflective of a hierarchy of status, 
perceived culpability and search for remediation. And, as governments socialize private FIRE sec-
tor debts, vulnerable groups are increasingly likely to be stigmatized as undeserving, unproductive 
and parasitic on the system (an incredible inversion, given that it is in fact finance capital that is 
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parasitic). For example, stoked by a right wing media, waves of scorn are poured on the unem-
ployed, public sector workers, single mothers, the chronically ill plus young people and trade union 
members who take to the streets in protest. All these groups have been demonized and risk being 
continually degraded in the Madoffized society. This is part of a quasi-Victorian morality play 
(Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012), which, as with relations of stigma on a more macro scale, is cru-
cially linked to perceived social value, entitlement to community membership and the wider distri-
bution of scarce resources.
Scapegoating already subordinated groups entails processes of hegemony where the dominant 
are struggling to assert their threadbare definition of the situation. This is clearly illustrated in post 
‘Celtic Tiger’ Ireland as the political and economic elites attempt to shift the negative spotlight 
from themselves onto the population at large (McCullagh, 2010). However, power meets resistance 
and the table is being turned. As with the global Occupy movement, which is pilloried by various 
elites (Taibbi, 2011), scapegoating extends to elite bankers who are presented as the parasitic one 
percent who exploit the remaining 99 percent of the population. Thus, as with journalistic accounts 
of white collar crime and banking fraud, the top one percent are typified and condemned as mon-
strous figures of popular culture. While we are highly critical of the scapegoating of vulnerable and 
exploited societal members, we would, as with the specific Madoff case, avoid being seduced by 
efforts to scapegoat banking institutions and ‘substitutable’ elite bankers or financiers. Money 
capitalists, as with capitalist executives more generally, simply ‘surf on prevailing social struc-
tures’, notably ‘re-invigorated relations of class’ (Scambler, 2006: 276). Our circumspection, we 
would stress, is not motivated by any interest to protect Goldman Sachs, or Wall Street more gener-
ally which is likely to continue with its mass (self-)deception, exploitation, secretive practices and 
obfuscation for as long as possible. Rather, we have distinct sociological concerns, rooted in a criti-
cal understanding of the Madoffized society qua network of exploitative social relations.
In resisting the seductive and populist idea that the financial powerhouse Goldman Sachs, for 
instance, is ‘a singularly malign force that is bent on world domination’, Hassan (2011: 397) writes: 
‘Goldman Sachs merely is the most efficient reflection of an economic system that is out of con-
trol’. As with Hassan’s analysis of the speed of economic collapse and his critique of government 
attempts to ‘fix’ this, there is a need to go beyond accounts that are preoccupied with the immediate 
present, and, we would add, touch the surface of the Madoffized society. Explicitly referring to ‘the 
demonization of Wall Street and its high profile bankruptcies’, Hassan (2011: 386–7) asserts that 
such ‘ready-to-hand’ explanations have also enabled ‘the finger of blame’ to be pointed at ‘nar-
rowly logical targets’ such as Bernie Madoff (or, more recently as we finalize this article in March 
2012, Allen Stanford in the US and Kautilya Pruthi in the UK). In short, we would favour efforts 
critically to engage deeper mechanisms, figurations, relations and logics, with their antecedents in 
historically unfolding conditions and systemic contradictions.
Correspondingly, we do not accept the popular depiction of Madoff as an aberration, just as we 
do not swallow the claim that government regulators in that case were ‘bureaucratic dullards’ (a 
view conveyed in an SEC 2009 investigative report, but which was contradicted when many of 
these individuals were subsequently promoted) (Lewis, 2010b: 538). Following Black (2005), the 
consequence of desupervision is that all those holding to formal rules are driven out of business (a 
Gresham’s dynamic). Those whose practices are restricted by the ethics of the old system are nec-
essarily expelled from their firms, or out of positions of power, leaving those most willing to 
‘stretch the envelope’ (and commit white collar crime) to rise to the top. This is partly why Žižek 
(2009: 35–6) objects to the depiction of Madoff as ‘a corrupt scoundrel, a rotten worm in the 
healthy green apple’. Žižek prefers to ask: ‘Is it not rather that the Madoff case presents us with an 
extreme and therefore “pure example” of what caused the financial breakdown itself?’ In other 
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words, if Madoff became a ‘rotten worm’ it was in adaptation to an environment that he was not 
personally responsible for creating.
In short, to scapegoat Madoff is to avoid consideration of what led Madoff to become what he 
was. To be clear, we have no intention of trivializing Madoff’s victims, their sometimes harrowing 
testimonies and reasons for vilifying Madoff as a monster or worse (see Lewis, 2010a, 2010b). 
However, we would maintain that the practice of explaining the affair in terms of some inherently 
evil individual qualities – a recklessness, ruthlessness or irrationality not evident in many other 
people – is yet more obfuscation. The social expression of these apparent traits (of which Madoff 
represents only an exaggerated example) occurs in waves under particular social conditions. Once 
we shift the focus away from the less flattering aspects of Madoff’s personality and dealings, and 
consider the institutional structure that enabled him to transform his business into a multi-billion 
dollar ponzi scheme, we find that the latter is of far greater consequence.
Conclusion
We began by posing a question: was Madoff’s ponzi scheme exceptional or does it tell us some-
thing about a much more pervasive and destructive process? We are of the view that far from being 
aberrant, his scam was a socio-logical consequence of the predominant debt-based forms of accu-
mulation that were deliberately fostered in the post-1970s era of global neoliberalization. We sug-
gest that the success of Madoff – and those ponzi schemers that have as yet avoided prosecution 
– depends less on the genius of individual fraudsters than on the systemic fictions and obfuscations 
of finance capital. The dominance of the latter ultimately depends on misplaced trust in an extrac-
tive system geared towards the reproduction of increasingly inequitable and exploitative social 
relations. In short, mass deception, efforts to maintain secrecy and silence, obfuscation and scape-
goating are instrumental in the Madoffized society albeit while sowing the seeds for ongoing con-
flict on a global stage. This is the madness of Madoffization, where ‘insane forms’ prevail. Ticktin’s 
(2010: 373) conclusion on today’s crisis therefore seems especially apt to us: ‘“Whom the gods 
would destroy they first make mad” is a good description of the present stage of capitalism’.
The irrational processes characterizing global neoliberalization, along with those elements we 
have referred to as Madoffization, are both rooted in the internal contradictions of financial capital-
ism and its constantly expanding claims on wealth. Madoffization entails borrowing from the 
future, loading debt onto the vast majority of a population to the benefit of wealthy elites seeking 
to protect, consolidate and amplify their class-based interests. The role of economists, regulatory 
bodies, rating agencies, the mass media and government officials have all proven crucial to the 
systemic reproduction of the necessary obfuscations, which became increasingly pervasive as the 
financial cycle reached its super-speculative (ponzi) stage (Rasmus, 2008). We would add that 
where speculative finance dominates economic activity, the elements of Madoffization quickly 
follow. Mountains of debt, waves of fraud, economic collapse and social unrest become inevitable. 
Though the Madoff scam may have emerged partly as historical accident, Madoffization is a prod-
uct of the prevailing forms of accumulation that know no bounds. The global dominance of finance 
capital is inseparable both from the over-accumulation of capital and ever sharpening class antago-
nisms. Within this volatile mix Madoffization serves to facilitate, and thereafter postpone, the 
consequences of debt expansion, which must ultimately result in widespread default, sharp asset-
price collapse and insolvency of financial institutions (or, more disturbingly, entire nations follow-
ing the socialization of private losses).
Significantly, it was those commentators who most resolutely rejected neo-classical economics 
who managed to anticipate the implosion of finance capital. After careful analysis of the most 
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accurate warnings, Dirk Bezemer (2009) shows how the abandonment of the neo-classical model 
was prerequisite to the awareness of instability and the significance of debt. Those that rejected 
mainstream views, such as Australian economist Steve Keen (1995), could see that periods of 
apparent stability were illusory, that a continuous growth in the ratio of private debt to GDP would 
eventually end in financial collapse. Keen (2006) went public at a time when conditions of eupho-
ria prevailed, when asset-price inflation fuelled risky borrowing and lending, and vice versa. Keen 
warned that more debt was incurred than the system was capable of financing, and that financial 
collapse was inevitable. Such prescience was not limited to hitherto marginalized economists 
either; as with Harvey (2006 [1982]), Marxian scholars addressing geographical questions cor-
rectly anticipated the cataclysmic crash.
The inevitable implosion of finance capital, which revealed its ponzi character to the world, has 
not led those mainstream economists who facilitated the systemic deception to atone for (or even 
admit) their own complicity. On the contrary, many have sought to hide the deception that has been 
uncovered with yet more deception. Rather than acknowledging the ponzi character of the system 
that has imploded – or scrutinizing the contradictions, interests, mind-sets, corruptions and institu-
tional arrangements at play – financiers and their representatives are working on an even more 
brazen deception: convincing the world that no one could have seen the crisis coming; a message 
pushed despite an observable history of repeatedly ignored warnings.
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